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Shareholders' Derivative Suits in Minnesota: Function
and Operation Of the Control Requirements
I. INTRODUCTION
The shareholder's derivative action developed as an equitable remedy to check the abuse of power by corporate management.1 This peculiar legal phenomenon empowers a shareholder to sue management or third parties on behalf of the corporation, 2 providing a means whereby the management must
account for damages inflicted upon the corporation by its misdeeds or failure to enforce valid claims against third parties.3
Recognizing that some such police power was needed, but fearful that harassment might result from its untrammeled use,4 the
courts have developed a set of requirements intended to function as controls. 5 In Hawes v. Oakland,6 the Supreme Court es1. Prunty, The Shareholder'sDerivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980 (1957).

2. Depending on the character of the right asserted or the injury
complained of, a shareholder's suit may be "direct" or "derivative."
Broadly speaking, a direct action arises from acts or transactions upon
which a shareholder may sue inhis own right and for his own personal
benefit. A derivative action, on the other hand, isbased upon a right
of action not personal to the shareholder-plaintiff but existing in the
corporation itself; the shareholder acts as a sort of guardian ad litem for
the corporation's interest, while the corporation is nominally cast as a
party defendant. Courts generally agree, for example, that a suit by a
minority shareholder attempting to block the "freeze-out" of his interest is a direct action, Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3rd
Cir. 1947), and that a suit based upon alleged misappropriation of corporate assets by a director is derivative, Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S.
450 (1881), but where a suit is brought to compel declaration of a
dividend the authorities are divided. In Minnesota, it would be brought
as a nonderivative class action. See MN. R. Civ. P. 23 and Advisory
Committee Note (1968). The proper classification of a shareholder's
suit is frequently difficult. See Note, DistinguishingBetween Direct and
Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1962). No

attempt is made in this Note to develop or discuss the distinctions between the respective forms of action or the transactions upon which they
may be based, but it should be noted that the control requirements discussed herein apply only to the derivative action.
3. See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 74 (1967).
4. Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 37 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843); Dimpfell v. Ohio & M.R.R., 110 U.S. 209, 210 (1884); Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450 (1881). See generally Prunty, supra note 1.
5. See Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-50
(1949).
6. 104 U.S. 450 (1881). Suits by shareholders had arisen prior
to Hawes v. Oakland, several of which are reviewed in the Hawes
opinion. But prior to its decision in that case the Supreme Court had
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tablished, as conditions precedent to a derivative suit, the requirements of contemporaneous ownership of stock and of prior demands upon the directors and shareholders.7 Hawes was subsequently incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and is retained in rule 23.1.8 In addition to these original requirements, the Federal Rules and the procedural rules of a
number of states9 provide for judicial supervision of dismissals
or settlements in derivative actions.
This Note will not attempt a thoroughgoing treatment of all
the problems raised by the operation of the control requirements
in derivative litigation. Instead, it will review the origin, development, treatment and function of the various controls. Minnesota case law, and related federal case law, are analyzed in detail
with a view to understanding the Minnesota court's conception
of the derivative suit and the manner in which the control requirements should operate.
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF CONTEMPORANEOUS
OWNERSHIP
A.

IN Ga

Two basic stock ownership requirements are normally imposed as conditions precedent to bringing a derivative suit. First,
by definition the plaintiff must be a "shareholder" at the commencement and for the duration of the action in order to have
standing to complain. 10 The law of the state of incorporation
determines who is a "shareholder" for purposes of suit," and by
not thoroughly analyzed the right of a shareholder to sue in a derivative
capacity, and the principles set forth in the Hawes decision have remained essentially unaltered. See Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422

(2d Cir. 1944); 3B

J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

r 23.1.15[1]

(2d ed. 1969).

See also Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite
to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARv. L. REV. 746 (1960). State courts were
not bound to follow the Hawes ruling as regards the control requirements, and in some cases they did not. See note 25 infra. But the
influence of the federal practice, if not dominating, has been weighty.
See notes 21 & 48 infra.
7. 104 U.S. at 461.
8. Galdi v. Jones, 141 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1944). See generally
3B J. MOORE, supra note 6, 23.1.15[1]. See also Note, supra note 6, at
746.
9. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders'
Actions-PartI, 22 Sw. L.J. 767 &n.3 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Sorin v. Shahmoon Ind., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 408, 429,
220 N.Y.S.2d 760, 780 (1961); 3B J. MoORE, supra note 6,
23.1.17.

1123.1.16[3],

11. Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90, 93 (3rd Cir. 1941); Entel v.
Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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a liberal construction of the term, courts have allowed derivative2
suits to be brought by beneficiaries of stock held in trust,14
13
actual owners of stock held in street names, pledgees of stock,
parties who have been induced by fraud to convey their stock to
another,15 legatees with equitable title to the stock'8 and holders
of warrants.' 7 Courts also recognize a "double derivative" suit, 18
in which a plaintiff holding shares in a subsidiary corporation
brings an action on its behalf against the parent. 9
21
Second, the federal courts20 and most state jurisdictions
12. Brown v. Dolese, 38 Del. Ch. 471, 154 A.2d 233 (1959); Schlegel v. Schlegel Mfg. Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 808, 258 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1965).

Cf. Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959).

13. Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del.. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (1964).
14. Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. The Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp.

640 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

15. Willcox v. Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.

1933).
16. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 844 (1945).

Court, 17 Cal. 2d 13, 108 P.2d 906 (1941).

But cf., Klopstock v. Superior

17. Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
18. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 737 (1944). See generally Painter, Double Derivative Suits and
Other Remedies with Regard to Damaged Subsidiaries,36 IND. L.J. 143

(1961).

19. Several instances of "triple" or "multiple" derivative suits
have been recorded. See Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating
Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); Holmes v. Camp, 180 App. Div.
409, 167 N.Y.S. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1917). In Kaufman v. Wolfson, 1 App.
Div. 2d 555, 151 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1956) the court stated:
Plaintiff should have his remedy whether it be regarded as a
double derivative or a triple derivative action. The key.. . is
the essential fact that control of all. three corporations has remained unchanged. In this era of corporate mobility a complaining stockholder should not be required to play a form of
shell-and-pea game with a group of dominant directors who
control all the corporations involved in the transfers of stock.
151 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
Conversely, mere stock ownership in one corporation by another,
absent any element of "control," may be insufficient to sustain a double
derivative action. Breswick & Co. 'r. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp.,
280 App. Div. 821, 114 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct.), appeal denied, 280 App.
Div. 892, 115 N.Y.S.2d 302, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 840, 109 N.E.2d
712 (1952).
20. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881); FED. R. CIrV.
P. 23.1 (1968).
Compliance with the contemporaneous ownership requirement may
be unnecessary, however, where the suit is based upon a right created
by federal statute. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954)
(no contemporaneous ownership requirement in an action brought under section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act to recover short-swing
profits from insider). But see Gotteman v. General Motors Corp.,
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acknowledge the "contemporaneous ownership" rule, which requires that a derivative plaintiff must have held his interest at
the time of the alleged wrong to the corporation, or that his shares
must have subsequently devolved upon him by operation of law.
The contemporaneous ownership requirement was first imposed
by the United States Supreme Court in Hawes v. Oakland22 and
was intended primarily to prevent the transfer of shares to an
out-of-state plaintiff in order that he might gain access to the
federal courts.23

In developing the rule, however, subsequent

courts expressed concern about the practice of purchasing litigation, and the secondary purpose of the contemporaneous ownership rule was recognized to prevent plaintiffs from purchasing
stock for the sole purpose of instituting litigation in the hope
of coercing a private settlement from the defendants. 24 This
latter function has been reflected in the widespread adoption of
25
the rule by state courts and legislatures.
Despite its widespread and long-standing acceptance, the
contemporaneous ownership rule is not without its faults. In the
first place, it has never been clear whether the rule is substantive or procedural. 2 6 Thus, an Erie2 7 problem may arise in
268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (derivative suit based on violation of
antitrust law is subject to provisions of federal rule 23b).
21. States which have adopted the contemporaneous ownership requirement either by court rule or statute are listed in 3B, J. MooPE,
supra note 6, f 23.1.15 [2], n.6.
22. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
23. Id. at 453, 461.
24. While the Hawes Court did not coin the term, it was clearly
concerned with the problem of "strike suits." See Dimpfell v. Ohio &
M. R.R., 110 U.S. 209, 210 (1884). A thorough, albeit biased, analysis of
the strike suit problem appears in F. WooD, SURvEY m REPORT RGAmniNG
STOcKHOLDERs' DERVATvE SuiTs (1944), the report which led to the
adoption of the New York "Security for Expenses" statute (see text
accompanying notes 138-40 infra).
Federal Courts recognize the dual purpose of the rule. See Bateson
v. Magna Oil Co., 414 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1969) and Pioche Mines Consol.,
Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1964) where the court states:
"The purpose of [federal rule 23.1] is to protect the courts from
collusive actions, and to protect corporations and their officers and
directors from strike suits." 333 F.2d at 265.
25. In absense of a formal rule or statute, state courts did not generally impose the contemporaneous ownership requirement. See Pollitz
v. Gould, 202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088 (1911); Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk
Horn Coal Corp., 133 W. Va. 639, 57 S.E.2d 736 (1950); Bank of Mil
Creek v. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 136 W. Va. 36, 65 S.E.2d 892 (1951).
26. The Advisory Committee recognized at the time the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated that it was uncertain
whether the contemporaneous ownership requirement was substantive
or procedural. The question was left to be resolved by the courts.
Note of Advisory Committee, Rule 23b, FE. R. Civ. P. (1946 ed.).

Fed-
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a diversity suit should the law of the state where the suit
arose reject the contemporaneous ownership rule.28 Second,
while the requirement of contemporary ownership may limit the
opportunities for strike suitors, it has by no means curtailed the
practice. Those who specialize in strike suits, it is said, can live
with the rule.29 The problem is a difficult one, and no proposed
solution which fails to meet the problem directly can promise to
offer a satisfactory answer. Finally, in a very basic sense, to
require contemporaneous ownership seems inconsistent with
the theory that a derivative suit is brought upon a cause of
action belonging to the corporation with any recovery accruing
to the corporation and benefiting all shareholders alike.30
Whatever the supporting rationale, strict enforcement of
the rule will often prevent the trying of meritorious claims.31
eral courts generally treat the contemporaneous ownership rule embodied in federal rule 23.1 as a rule of procedure and apply it accordingly. If, however, the rule were viewed as substantive in character, the
Erie doctrine would require that state law, if in conflict with the federal
rule, be controlling. Several courts have recognized that the possible
conflict presents a serious problem, but it. should probably be noted that
those jurisdictions opposed to the prevailing view constitute a dwindling
minority. See generally, 3B J. MooRE, supra note 6, j 23.1.01[4],
23.1.15[2].
27. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. See note 26 supra.
29. 3B J. MooRE, supra note 6, 23.1.15 [2].
30. See generally Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L. REV. 1, 7 (1947).

Occasionally an attempt is

made to justify the rule on some other ground as well. Some authorities contend that the rule is fundamentally derived from equitable principles which stop a shareholder from complaining of transactions occurring prior to the time he acquired his interest. 3B J. MooRE, supra
note 6, 1 23.1.15[2]. Among the propositions advanced in this regard
are: (1) that the purchaser of stock should acquire only the rights of
the vendor, who could not have sued upon transactions in which he
participated as a wrongdoer or to which he had "consented," United
Elec. Sec. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Light Co., 68 Fed. Rep. 673 (E.D. La.
1895), and (2) that the purchaser should have no standing to complain
of prior acts since any damages caused thereby would already have been
accounted for in a lowered purchase price for the stock. Home Fire
Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). See also Note,
Stockholder's Derivative Suit Complaining of Transactions Occurring
Prior to His Acquisition of Stock Under the Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure, 32 IowA L. REv. 81, 83 (1946). To state, however, that a purchaser of stock has no greater rights than his vendor merely begs the
question. To assume that the purchase price reflects any damage the
corporation may have sustained ignores the fact that the harm
caused by wrongful acts may be realized only after considerable delay. Furthermore, the passage of time tends to eliminate qualified
shareholder-plaintiffs, especially where trading in the stock has been
heavy.
31. See Kaufman v. Wolfson, 1 App. Div. 2d 555, 556, 151 N.Y.S.2d
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Of course, if the rule is intended only to limit the jurisdiction of
the courts, the question of its application would be, and should
be, independent of any consideration of the merits of the claim.
But to the extent that the rule owes its origins to the fear of
purchased litigation, the merits of the claim should not be ignored. In this context, there would seem to be no reason to
preclude a suit by someone who purchased stock without knowledge of the wrong and before the damage was manifest. The
need for such an approach might be obviated by a determination
that the wrong does not "occur" until discovered.32 A better
approach, however, might be to allow a plaintiff who knew of
the wrongful act to sue if (1) he has made a bona fide and
substantial investment or (2) he can show that no lawsuit
was contemplated at the time he purchased stock and that the
true extent of the damage was not then apparent, or that by the
time the damage became apparent there existed no qualified
shareholder willing to undertake the litigation. The rule should
be carefully applied with a view to its underlying rationales and
should be avoided when its only real effect would be to shield
wrongdoing management.
In fact, the development of the contemporaneous ownership
rule indicates judicial recognition that without some modification
the rule would be a crude tool, overly broad in its impact. State
courts have allowed intervention by shareholders who do not
meet the contemporaneous ownership test.8 3 Courts may also
530, 532 (Sup. Ct. 1956). See also Dykstra, supra note 3, at 94.
32. A parallel concept is applied in fraud cases where a statute of
limitations is interposed as a defense. In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392 (1946), Justice Frankfurter wrote:
.[Where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and "remains in
ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on
his part, the bar of the statute [of limitations] does not begin to
run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special
circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the
fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party" [citations ommitted].
327 U.S. at 392. See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965);
Lenhart v. Lenhart Wagon Co., 210 Minn. 164, 298 N.W. 37 (1941) (see
note 127 infra.); Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders In New York Courts,
56 YALE. L.J. 942, 953 (1947).
33. See, e.g., Sorin v. Shalunoon Ind., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 408, 220
N.Y.S.2d 760, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 184
Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Cf. Cohen v. Young, 127
F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942); Duncan v. National Tea Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d
280, 287, 144 N.E.2d 771, 775 (1957). Baker v. McFadden Publications,
Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 329, 90 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1950). But see Richman v.
Felmus, 16 Misc. 2d 377, 182 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1958), modified by

8 App. Div. 2d 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Breswick & Co.
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recognize the "continuing wrong" theory, under which a derivative plaintiff may complain of a wrong which commenced before
he became a shareholder if the wrong "continues" in the sense
that it has not been consummated at the time of the suit.3 4 A
leading case on this point is Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Incorporated, 85 involving the issue of stock to the directors of the
corporation without adequate consideration. Subsequent to the
resolution authorizing the issue, but prior to the execution and
delivery of the certificates, plaintiffs became equitable owners.
The court held that the suit was not barred by the Delaware
contemporaneous ownership statute since the transaction was
not completed until the certificates were actually issued. 86 In
Palmer v. Morris37 a stockholder was allowed to complain of
v. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp., 280 App. Div. 821, 114 N.Y.S.2d 25, appeal

denied, 280 App. Div. 892, 115 N.Y.S.2d :302, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y.

840, 109 N.E.2d 712 (1952).
Federal courts generally hold that the contemporaneous ownership
requirement applies to intervenors as well as to original plaintiffs, even
if state law may hold to the contrary. See Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Kaufman v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). But see Fuller v. American Mach. & Found. Co., 95 F. Supp. 764

(S.D.N.Y. 1951). Cf. Pioche Mines Consol. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257
(9th Cir. 1964).
34. See Lissauer v. Bertels, 37 F. Supp. 881, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
Newkirk v. W.J. Rainey, Inc., 31 Del. CIt 433, 436, 76 A.2d 121, 123
(1950); 13 W. FLETcHER, Cyc. CoRps. § 5982 (1943 Perm. ed.).
35. 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830 (1954).
36. [W]hile the statute should be construed so as to reasonably effectuate its primary purpose-to discourage a type of
strike suit-it should not be construed so as to unduly encourage the camouflaging of transactions and thus prevent reason-

able opportunitites to rectify corporate aberrations....
This statute was not passed to prevent the correction of
corporate wrongdoing. It was designed principally to prevent
the purchasing of stock to be used for the purpose of filing a
derivative action attacking transactions occurring prior to such
purpose ....

•..

[T]o consider this transaction as having been completed

prior to the issuance of the certificates would sanction an ap-

plication of the statute not required by its language and not
fairly required to effectuate its purpose....
35 Del. Ct at 43, 109 A.2d at 833.
37. 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Bateson v. Magna Oil
Co., 414 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1969), where the court applied Palmer v.
Morris in sustaining a noncontemporaneous stockholder's complaint

which alleged that the defendant director had caused the corporation to
pay him excessive salaries, to advance him money on open account and
to mortgage its property as security for his personal indebtedness. The
complaint also alleged that defendant made excessive use of the corporation's airplane and mismanaged certain of the corporation's properties. The language of the opinion suggests that under the court's view
of the continuing wrong theory, an action could be maintained although
the stock was purchased with the intent to sue. 414 F.2d at 130.
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contracts entered into prior to his acquisition of the stock where
payments under the disputed contracts were continuing at the
time he acquired his interest. The court found that the transaction had not "completely occurred ...
prior to plaintiff's
acquisition of his stock." 38 Other courts, however, have taken
a contrary view on the same issue,39 and the doctrine itself has
often been questioned.

40

Without applying the continuing wrong concept as such,
the court may still accept evidence concerning previous acts
where such evidence tends to disclose a continuing conspiracy
harmful to the corporation, or to provide a frame of reference
for evaluating subsequent acts in their true perspective. 4 1 It
has been stated that the cover-up of the original wrong is a
new and independent wrong, upon which a shareholder may

bring
B.

suit.42

IN MNmsoTA

In all essential respects, rule 23.06 of the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure 43 is a copy of federal rule 23.1. As amended
in 1968, it requires the plaintiff to allege either that he held
shares at the time of the acts complained of or that his shares
38. 316 F.2d 649, 650 (5th Cir. 1963).
39. See Goldie v. Yaker, 78 N.M. 485, 432 P.2d 841 (1967): 'We
distinguish the agreement as to price and payments on the price pursuant to the agreement.... The wrong complained of was in entering
the contract, not in carrying out the contract once it was entered."
Id. at 487, 432 P.2d at 843.
40. See, e.g., Weinhaus v. Gale, 237 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1956); Henis
v. Compania Agricola De Guatemala, 116 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1953);
Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Pergament v. Frazer,
93 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
Several states, however, have adopted something similar to the
continuing wrong concept through legislation. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE,
§ 834 (West 1955); Omro REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.311 (Baldwin Supp.

1966); Wis. STAT. ANw. § 180.405 (1957). These statutes require that a
derivative-plaintiff's ownership of shares be shown as of the time of the
transaction "or any part thereof." A Pennsylvania statute gives the
court jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a shareholder who cannot meet
the contemporaneous ownership requirement if it finds there is a strong
prima facie case for the claim asserted and circumstances which threaten
serious injustice if the suit may not be maintained. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, 2852-516 (Supp. 1966).
41. Rinn v. Asbestos Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1938); Sale v.
Pittsburgh Steel Co., 57 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1944); Dederick v. North
American Co., 5 FYm. RuLEs SEav. 23b.3, Case 3, 2 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Austin v. Gardiner, 188 Misc. 538, 68 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
42. Gluck v. Unger, 25 Misc. 2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct.),
appeal denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 911, 203 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (App. Div. 1960).

43. Rule 23.06, Derivative Actions by Shareholders or Members.
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devolved upon him thereafter by operation of law.4 4 This adoption of the contemporaneous ownership requirement represents
a new development in the law of Minnesota. The issue had
been raised in some early cases but the court had never felt
compelled to decide the question.4 5 It is significant that the
old rule 23.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which
became effective January 1, 1952, paralleled the former federal
rule 23(b) but omitted the provisions relating to contemporaneous ownership of stock.4 6 It may be assumed that the rulesmakers did not consider contemporaneous ownership to be a requirement in Minnesota at that time. In any event, the question had
not been determined, and, since no case arose upon the point, it
remained an open question until the revision of the Minnesota
44. Minnesota courts traditionally have allowed a liberal interpretation of the terms "share" and "shareholder." In Baldwin v. Canfield,
26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879), a case -which predates even Hawes v.
Oakland, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that pledgees of
stock, as well as actual shareholders, have an interest sufficient to
maintain an action to prevent the wrongful transfer of corporate assets
to third parties. The double derivative suit was recognized in Singer v.
Allied Factors, Inc., 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d 378 (1944) which, as
originally commenced, was a derivative action charging directors with
wrongful transfers of corporate assets. The plaintiff held no shares in
the corporation for which relief was sought; his standing was based
upon shareholdings in another corporation which held preferred stock in
the "injured" corporation.
45. In Venner v. Great N. Ry., 117 Minn. 447, 136 N.W. 271 (1912),
a shareholder complained that certain company officers, in violation of
the corporate charter and state law, had caused the company to invest
heavily in various securities and real properties not necessary or appropriate to the operation of the railroad, and that, in addition, they
were managing these investments to their own benefit. The court stated
that on the facts alleged the plaintiff might be entitled to a sale of the
properties for the benefit of the stockholders, and that it was "unnecessary to determine" whether the plaintiff could question the propriety of
certain transactions which had occurred prior to his acquisition of
stock. The court would not face the .ssue squarely, but noted that
"upon the suggested question the authorities are not in harmony."
117 Minn. at 457, 136 N.W. at 275. In National Power & Paper Co. v.
Rossman, 122 Minn. 355, 142 N.W. 818 (1913), the defendant, while a
director of the corporation, had fraudulently induced it to purchase
materials from his accomplices at greatly inflated prices. Payments
were made in part by issuing stock. After the defendant resigned as
director, the corporation instituted an action against him, but collusively dismissed it shortly thereafter. A group of stockholders then
intervened and succeeded in vacating the dismissal. The court refused
to dismiss those who failed to show contemporaneous ownership, noting
that one of the intervenors had apparently owned shares since the inception of the corporation. The court implied, however, than even in
absence of that fact the action may have been allowed.
46. See M. PIRSIG, MINNESOTA PLEADING ff 420, n.85 (Rev. 4th ed.
1956).

Rule 23.02 is set out at note 69 infra.
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Rules of Civil Procedure in 1968.
As the comment to rule 23.06 indicates, the contemporaneous

ownership provision was inserted to prevent a person from buying stock solely for the purpose of maintaining a shareholder's
suit.47 This is weak justification for a strong rule. As already
noted, not only does the rule fail in its announced purpose, but
the problem to which it is addressed has never been manifest
in Minnesota. Perhaps the rulesmakers were primarily motivated by a desire to bring the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure into line with those of the federal courts. There is,
however, little to recommend the adoption of a rule so intimately associated with the peculiar jurisdictional problems of
the federal courts. Considering the hardships the rule may
place upon shareholders with meritorious claims, it is to be
hoped that the application of the rule will be consistent with the
reasons for its adoption in Minnesota. Where a particular case
presents none of the dangers associated with purchased litigation, relaxing the contemporaneous ownership rule should not
impair its fundamental purpose. Perhaps upon a re-evaluation
of its position, the Minnesota Supreme Court would expunge
the contemporaneous ownership requirement altogether.

III. THE REQUIREMENT OF A DEMAND UPON
DIRECTORS
A. IN GENEAL
The requirement of a demand upon the directors is fundamental to the concept of a derivative suit. A shareholder may
not preempt a course of action properly to be taken by the directors. Only after the proper representatives of the corporation have failed in their duty to act in its behalf does the share48
holder's right to act arise.
Aside from considerations of theoretical consistency, a number of practical functions may be served by requiring the share47. "[Rule 23.06] requires that the plaintiff be a shareholder at
the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share was
obtained by him by operation of law. The purpose is to prevent persons from purchasing stock solely for purposes of maintaining shareholders' derivative actions." Advisory Committee Note-1968, supra note
2.
48. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See generally 3B J.
MooRE, supra note 6, f 23.15[l], [4], 23.19; Note, supra note 6.
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holder to approach the directors. The demand may serve to
enlighten directors who are unaware of the wrongs alleged or
supply them with critical information on the issue. If the board
is aware of the wrong but hesitant to act, a demand by shareholders might precipitate the action desired. Conversely, the
board may be able to show the complaining shareholder that
his information was erroneous or his conclusions mistaken, and
a lawsuit might thereby be avoided. But in any case, the making
of a demand points out the dissatisfaction among the shareholders, and should motivate the boaxd to consider the merits of
the particular complaint and the range of responses that may
be warranted. Perhaps the cumulative effect of such demands,
as indications of the shareholders' vigilance, would in itself serve
49
to discourage wrongdoing.
Different questions are raised concerning the effect of directors' response to a shareholder's demand. If the directors themselves sue, a derivative action is automatically precluded since
the shareholder's right to sue arises only after the corporation
has failed to act.50 Should the directors decide that no suit is
warranted, however, a shareholder's suit would still be precluded if it appears that the board's decision was a legitimate
exercise of business judgment, consistent with its fiduciary duty
to the corporation and shareholders.51 Most courts respect the
directors' business judgment and will not interfere with decisions concerning business matters, regardless of whether the
directors' judgment proves correct. Thus, a corporation may
forego action on a valid claim against a third party if it can
offer a valid business reason for so doing.52 Nonetheless, the
directors, as fiduciaries, are duty bound to protect the corporation and their discretion is limited in that respect. They may
not acquiesce where damage has been wrongfully inflicted or
exonerate the wrongdoer.53 Thus, in most jurisdictions, the
decision not to prosecute a director for fraud, even if made by
49. On the latter point, see Note, sul:Ta note 48.
50. Cf. Singer v. Allied Factors, 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d 378
(1944). See also, Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962),
where, in the face of evidence indicating that the officers had taken
some action and might consider further action, the complaint was
found insufficient.
51.

See 2 G. HoRNST

, CoxuoRA ioN LAw

AND

PRACTIcE,

1 716

(1959 ed.); cf. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1957).
52. Warner v. E.C. Warner, 226 Minn. 565, 33 N.W.2d 721 (1948).
53. See Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 103-04, 111 So. 2d 1, 5-6
(1959); Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965);
Shaw v. Straight, 107 Minn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909).
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a disinterested majority of the board, would not automatically
bar a subsequent shareholder's suit. 4
Even where the directors lack the power to prevent the
shareholder's contemplated action, the demand requirement is
desirable in view of the benefits inherent in such a procedure
and the relatively slight burden it imposes upon the complaining
shareholder. In addition, the requirement should not be so
strictly applied that any technical failure in compliance therewith would deprive the shareholder of standing, regardless of
the merits of his claim. Thus, it is generally acknowledged
that the requirement need not be imposed when it is apparent
that a demand would be only a futile gesture,55 as where a majority of the directors are personally involved in the alleged
wrongdoing 56 or where the particular director charged is also
57
the controlling shareholder.
54. A shareholder may still ask the court to determine whether
the acts of which he complains constituted fraud rather than the exercise of business judgment. Even where a disinterested majority of directors concludes that the party charged is innocent of fraud or wrongdoing, or that the disputed transaction was within the legitimate scope
of his discretion, a complaining shareholder may still be able to get at
least a preliminary hearing on the fraud issue merely by asserting the
claim in court. Two Minnesota cases illustrate the point. In Boyum
v. Jordan, 146 Minn. 66, 178 N.W. 158 (1920), the plaintiff, formerly the
manager and controlling shareholder, charged one of the trustees with
taking secret profits during a reorganization. The remaining trustees
were convinced that the claim was groundless but the court entertained
the suit, reviewing all the evidence before concluding that the trustees'
evaluation was correct. In Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565,
33 N.W.2d 721 (1948), a director of a holding company, pursuant to authority requested and received from the board of directors, sold certain stockholdings belonging to the company at the prevailing market
price. A shareholder charged the director with waste of the corporate
assets, alleging that he concealed the fact that the "book value" of the
stock substantially exceeded the market price, and that the stock was
increasing in value. There was, however, no evidence that the director had benefited in any way from the sale, and the court found that
the decision to sell the stock was a bona fide exercise of business judgment. That conclusion terminated the litigation, for no action will lie
where the evidence establishes no more than error or misjudgment.
But again, the court had to review the entire case in order to determine
whether the acts complained of amounted to actionable fraud or waste.
While the courts traditionally have respected management's judgment
in business matters, they apparently have been less willing to let the
managers have the final word in evaluating each other's culpability.
55. Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1955). But a mere allegation that a demand would be futile is not
in itself enough. Robison v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1966).
56. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Atiantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir. 1964); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1949); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
57. See Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936
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Recognizing these principles, federal rule 23.1 does not specifically require a demand, but the plaintiff must allege any efforts he has made to obtain the desired action and the reasons
for failure to obtain the action, or, where appropriate, the reason for failure to make the efforts. 58 The courts have generally
exercised discretion in deciding whether a particular complaint
alleges efforts sufficient to meet the requirement or conditions
sufficient to excuse it. As a resflt, such matters are currently judged by widely varying standards.59
B. IN

-INNESoTA

Although the existence of the director demand requirement
has always been acknowledged in Minnesota,6 0 a reading of the
earlier cases reveals that the shareholder's failure to make a
demand does not necessarily preclude maintenance of a derivative suit. It has long been presumed that if the alleged fraud
implicates a majority of the board, or a director who is the controlling shareholder, a demand would be meaningless and need
not be made.6 ' The court's respect for management's judgment
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (one hostile director controlled the board; taken together, the defendants were also the majority shareholders); Rothwell
v. Robinson, 39 Minn. 1, 38 N.W. 772 (1888).
58. The complaint shall allege with particularity the efforts,
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from
the directors or comparable authority .

.

. and the reasons for

his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, as amended, (July 1, 1966).
59. See generally 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, f[ 23.1.19 (2d ed.
1969). A few courts have been dissatisfied with what would seem to be
rather detailed and particular allegations describing the plaintiff's good
faith efforts to make an effective demand. See Long v. Stites, 88 F.2d
554 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937); Gunn v. Voss, 154 F.
Supp. 345 (D. Wyo. 1957); 3B. J. MooRE, supra, 1 23.1.19. Similarly, courts
have occasionally adhered to the requirement even where the complaint
clearly indicated that demand would be futile. Id. 1[ 23.1.19 nn.22, 23.
Most courts, however, do not preserve the ritual to the point of requiring
absurd demands. Id. 1[ 23.1.19 n.19.
60. See Rothwell v. Robinson, 39 Mhan. 1, 38 N.W. 772 (1888).
61. See, e.g., Savory v. Berkey, 212 Minn. 1, 2 N.W.2d 146 (1942);
Briggs v. Kennedy Mayonnaise Products, Inc., 209 Minn. 312, 297 N.W.
342 (1941); Weiland v. N.W. Distilleries, Inc., 203 Minn. 600, 281 N.W.
364 (1938); Anderson v. Campbell, 176 Minn. 411, 223 N.W. 624 (1929);
Burns v. Essling, 154 Minn. 304, 191 N.W. 899 (1923); Seitz v. Michel;
148 Minn. 474, 181 N.W. 106 (1921); Tasler v. Peerless Tire Co., 144 Minn.
150, 174 N.W. 731 (1919); National Power & Paper Co. v. Rossman, 122
Minn. 355, 142 N.W. 818 (1913); Venner v. Great N. R.R., 117 Minn.
447, 136 N.W. 271 (1912); Pencille v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co.,
74 Minn. 67, 76 N.W. 1026 (1898); Rothwell v. Robinson, 39 Minn. 1, 38

N.W. 772 (1888).
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in business matters is also firmly established. 62 But where the
majority of the board, in response to a shareholder's demand,
acknowledges the fraud of one of the directors but refuses to
take action, the court has allowed the shareholder to proceed.
In Shaw v. Staight63 a director had persuaded the rest of the
board to issue and exchange a substantial block of stock for the
assets of a partnership in which he had an interest. When the
assets were later found to be worthless, the plaintiff demanded
that the directors rescind the issuance of the stock and nullify
its transfer to the defendant. The directors declined to act.
The court held that the directors had no discretion to refuse to
protect the shareholders and the corporation from fraud, and
64
that their refusal to act did not bar the shareholder's action.
This result clearly reflects sound policy. Where a corporation
has suffered considerable damage at the hands of a director, a
board acting in good faith would not exonerate the wrongdoer
without offering compelling reasons for so doing. As the Shaw
court indicated, the directors' failure to take action might in itself be viewed as a breach of the duty to protect the corporation. 65
It may also indicate that the board was derelict in failing to
investigate the transaction sufficiently. At the least, an un62. See Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 199
Minn. 382, 272 N.W. 277 (1937); Nelson v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 197

Minn. 151, 266 N.W. 857 (1936); Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co.,
186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932); Jaques v. Missabe Electric Co., 172
Minn. 303, 215 N.W. 185 (1927); Mortgage Land Invest. Co. v. McMains,
172 Minn. 110, 215 N.W. 192 (1927); Seitz v. Elite Laundry Co., 152
Minn. 469, 189 N.W. 589 (1922); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co.,
152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 (1922); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188
N.W. 266 (1922).
63. 107 Minn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909).
64. The court's analysis is confusing, however. Although it treated
the action as derivative, the court suggested that the shareholders had
a right of action of their own, and that no demand would have been
necessary. The court also stated, incorrectly, that upon a cause of action
accruing to the corporation the directors refusal to bring suit would be
final unless a majority of the shareholders opposed it. 107 Minn. at
160-61, 119 N.W. at 954.
65. The fact that the transaction complained of was fraudulent
and operated to the damage and injury of the stockholders of
the corporation made it the duty of the officers thereof to
bring an action in compliance with the request of plaintiffs..
It being the duty of the officers to protect the stockholders and
the corporation from the fraud of others, it cannot well be
said to be discretionary with them whether to perform that
duty ....
107 Minn. at 160, 119 N.W. at 954. See also Gluck v. Unger, 25 Misc. 2d
554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct.), appeal denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 911, 203
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1960).
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explained failure to act may be taken as evidence of the board's
impropriety, and should not preclude a shareholder from acting
in the corporation's behalf.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, in accord with the
federal rules, require a plaintiff to allege "with particularity"
the efforts which he has made to obtain the action he desires
from the directors and his reasons for failure to obtain the action or to make the effort. 6 6 To date, the only case dealing
with the application of the Minnesota rule is Winter v. Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union,67 involving a cooperative organization which had become inactive. In an action commenced
by members of the cooperative, the president was charged with
misappropriating corporate funds to his personal use. The plaintiffs further alleged that the question of restoration of the funds
withdrawn without authority was brought to the attention of
the board of directors, which failed to take action to recover
the money. 68 The answer interposed defendant's counterclaim
for past salary due, and the case was tried on the issue of
the debt. The plaintiff prevailed at trial, but on appeal the defendant raised the issue that the action was derivative and that
the complaint had failed to meet the demand requirements of
rule 23.02 69-the predecessor of the present rule.
While indicating that such an objection, if made at the trial
level, "would have been fatal to the complaint, 7 0 by reading
the complaint in conjunction with the record, the court found
sufficient allegations of plaintiffs' reasons for failing to make the
formal demand. 1' The language of the opinion implies, how66. 1MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06 (1968).
67. 259 Minn. 257, 107 N.W.2d 226 (1911).
68. Id. at 260, 107 N.W.2d at 229.
69. Rule 23.02 provided:
In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of
one or more shareholders in a corporation or members in an
unincorporated association because the corporation or association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by
it, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the efforts of
the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees
and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members such action
as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reason for not making such effort.
M. PIRSIG, MINNESOTA PLEADING

420 (rev. 4th ed. 1956).

70. Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union, 259 Minn. 257, 265,
107 N.W.2d 226, 232 (1961). See also Hodgson v. Duluth, H. & D. R.R.,
46 Min. 454, 49 N.W. 197 (1891) (demurrer is proper where complaint
fails to show that it was impracticable for plaintiffs to move the corporation itself to bring the action).
71. The record disclosed that: (1) the matter had been discussed
at a board meeting at which the defendant presided; (2) the defendant
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ever, that had the case involved an "ordinary business corporation," rather than a loose and neglected cooperative, a more
strict compliance with the demand requirement would have been
72
expected.
Upon close analysis it appears that Winter really creates no
new law. The court acknowledged that while a demand should
ordinarily be made,7 3 it is not necessary when the wrongdoers
constitute a majority of the board, 74 or, by clear implication, a
sufficiently dominant minority.7 5 This is consistent with previous Minnesota case law. 7 6

What the Winter court meant by

implying that a more stringent demand requirement would have
been imposed in a case concerning an ordinary business corporation is not altogether clear. The court's analysis of the basis
for the demand requirement indicates that a clear and explicit
demand should be made in any case where a probability exists
that the directors might be willing and able to respond effectively.7 7 There would seem to be no reason, however, to require
any more action than was actually taken by the plaintiffs in the
Winter case. In such a case, if the court is dissatisfied with the
allegations, it should allow the plaintiff to amend the com78

plant.

admitted taking the funds but claimed his action was justified; (3) defendant would not voluntarily return the funds; (4) defendant challenged plaintiffs to sue for recovery; (5) at least one of the directors
then present refused to take part in any lawsuit against the defendant;
(6) the plaintiffs in the shareholders' suit included two members of the
board, and (7) at trial no justification for defendant's appropriation
of the funds could be shown. 259 Minn. at 266, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
72. Id. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 233-34.
73. Noting that the derivative suit is recognized as an extraordinary remedy, the court said:
The demand upon the managing directors and shareholders is
important in that it gives the management of the corporation
an opportunity to consider the merits of the dispute and to determine, in the interests of the corporation and shareholders,
whether it might be disposed of without the expense and delay of litigation. The demand requirement as a condition precedent to a shareholder's derivative suit is one not lightly to be
dispensed with.
Id. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
74. 259 Minn. at 266-67, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
75. Read together with the trial record the complaint indicated
only that the president, the sole functioning manager, was involved in
the transactions. 259 Minn. at 266, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
76. Weiland v. N.W. Distilleries, Inc., 203 Minn. 600, 281 N.W. 364
(1938).
77. See note 73 supra.
78. Cf. Pioche ines Consol. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir.
1964) (complaint supplemented by affidavit); Lynam v. Livingston,
257 F. Supp. 520 (D. Del. 1966) (supplemental complaint).
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IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF A DEMAND UPON
SHAREHOLDERS
A. IN GENERAL
The additional requirement of a demand upon shareholders,
which also dates from the formative years of the derivative
suit,79 was grounded primarily upon the theory that all possible
avenues of internal solution should be explored and exhausted
before the parties bring their grievances into court.8 0 While the
shareholders do not "manage" the corporation, they are capable,
at least in theory, of effecting remedial action of several kinds.
For example, it has been suggested that the majority shareholders might wish to ratify the act complained of, thus erasing
the cause of action completely. 8 ' Alternatively, they could attempt to induce the directors, through informal pressure, to
take the action desired. 2 Failing that, they could elect a new
board of directors who would take remedial action against the
wrongdoers of the old board. 3 A demand on the shareholders
may also be based on the belief that, absent an internal solution,
some or all of the shareholders might wish to join as derivative
plaintiffs,8 4 thereby increasing the plaintiffs' chances of success
and weakening any inference that the suit has only nuisance
value.
At present, the shareholder demand requirement is recognized in the federal courts and those of most states. The de79. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See generally
Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 97
(1967); Stickells, Derivative Suits-The Requirement of Demand upon
the Stockholders, 33 B.U.L. REV. 435 (1953); Note, 47 CORNELL L.Q.
84 (1961); Note, supra note 48; Comment, 48 MIcu. L. REV. 87 (1949);
Comment, 36 TEXAs L. REV. 641 (1958); Note, 30 U. Cnwm. L. REV. 196
(1961).
80. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881). The rule has
the additional function of deterring derivative litigation, however. See
Dykstra, supra note 79; Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders and Directors Under New York's Business Corporation Law: A Comparative
View, 11 BUFFALO L. REv. 496 (1962); Note, supra note 48.
81. Language to this effect appeared as early as Foss v. Harbottle,
2 Hare 461, 498-505, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 205-08 (Ch. 1843). See Hawes
v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 455 (1881).
82. See, e.g., Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 17, 99 N.E.
138, 141 (1912).
83. Abraham v. Parkins, 36 F. Supp. 238, 240 (W.D. Pa. 1940). See
also Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 447, 109 A.2d 277,
282 (1954); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138
(1912).
84. Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 109 A.2d 288
(1954). See also Note, supra note 48.
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mand is to be made "if necessary,"8 5 a reservation which reflects,
in part, the power of the shareholders to ratify the acts of the
directors. 86 But where the alleged wrong cannot be ratified, or
can be ratified only by unanimous vote, the complaining shareholder's right to sue presumably could not be affected by the
failure of the shareholders to respond as a body, or even by
their affirmative decision not to sue. Courts have generally
concluded that no demand is necessary in such a case.8 7 As a
second major exception to the rule, courts recognize that a
demand upon shareholders personally involved as wrongdoers,
as with a demand upon interested directors, would amount
to idle ceremony. Therefore, such a demand is not generally
considered to be "necessary."8 8
In a third group of cases, usually involving large public
corporations, the shareholder demand requirement has been
85. This is the phrasing adopted by the court in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881), and codified in rule 23.1, FED. R. Civ. P.
(1968), and rule 23.06, MNN. R. Civ. P. (1968).
86. See generally 3B J. MooRE, supra note 59, f 23.1.19; Stickells,
supra note 79; Note, supra note 48.
87. E.g., Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 Del. 1958); Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). For a discussion
of nonratifiable wrongs, see Note, 53 HAhv. L. REv. 1368 (1940).
A few courts have held to the contrary, requiring that a demand
upon the shareholders be made in all cases. The extreme position was
taken in Massachusetts, where the court justified the rule on the grounds
that a disinterested majority of shareholders has the absolute power to
decide not to sue even if it is powerless to ratify the wrong. Solomont
& Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp.. 316 Mass.
99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D.
Mass. 1951). Subsequent federal cases have indicated, however, that
the Massachusetts rule is something less than absolute. See Halprin v.
Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1962) (court found the corporation had
given its "tacit approval" to the suit); Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815,
819 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (Solomont rule not
applicable to derivative suit maintained upon a federally created
right); Heit v. Brown, 47 F.R.D. 33 (D. Mass. 1967) (necessity for
immediate action).
Other courts, while maintaining that a demand is required in all
cases, also state that a negative and disinterested shareholder vote
would not necessarily preclude continuation of the derivative action, especially where the vote was equivalent, in effect, to an attempt to ratify
fraud or illegal acts. Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532
(D.N.J. 1960); Abraham v. Parkins, 36 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Pa. 1940);
Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959); Escoett v. Aldecress
Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 109 A.2d 277 (1954).
Even under the Massachusetts rule, a negative shareholder vote is
effective as a bar only if the shareholders so voting were disinterested.
Braunstein v. Devine, 337 Mass. 408, 149 N.E.2d 628 (1958).
88. See generally 3B J. MooRE, supra note 59,
23.1.19.
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found unnecessary because it would be unreasonable under the
circumstances. Some courts have lifted the requirement, stating
that the effort and expense involved in making a demand
upon numerous and widely dispersed shareholders would be an
unconscionable burden to the plaintiff. 89 It has also been
recognized that the management of a publicly held corporation
may achieve "working control" of shareholder meetings while
holding considerably less than a majority of the voting shares.9 0
In a practical sense, the demand would be superfluous if opposed by the minority in control.9 1 Some courts have also suggested that a shareholder demand should not be required if
the majority shareholders lack the power to compel the corporation to sue,92 or if it would necessitate delay under circumstances
which threaten imminent and irreparable damage.9 3
When all of the exceptions to the shareholder demand requirement are considered together, the doctrine retains little
vitality. If the demand is only required when: (1) a disin89. In making this point, the court in Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d

815 (1st Cir. 1964) noted that the effort, even if made, would probably

fail in its purpose; shareholder inertia is legendary, and proposals
originating with shareholders rather than management rarely receive
more than a small fraction of the vote. See also Meltzer v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946, 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., 379
U.S. 841 (1964); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1959); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1942); Berg v.
Cincinnati N. & C. Ry., 56 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky. 1942). But see

Quirke v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 277 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1960); Haffer v. Voit,
219 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1955).

90. See Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S. R.R., 213 U.S. 435,
452 (1909); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 F. 529, 541 (6th
Cir. 1915).
91. Id. See also Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946
(4th Cir.), cert. denied sub. noma., 379 U.S. 841 (1964); Gottesman v.
General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959). Cf. Heit v. Brown, 47
F.R.D. 33 (D. Mass. 1967), which indicates that even under the Massachusetts rule no demand on shareholders is required if "the holders of

a majority stock interest are in the group of wrongdoers, or under

their control." Id. at 35.
92.

The question of whether shareholders had the power to compel

the corporation to take action on their behalf was raised, but not answered, in Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435,
453 (1909). In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1959) the court listed the shareholders' lack of such power among the
grounds for excusing the demand. Accord, Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157
Iowa 94, 135 N.W. 37 (1912). See generally 2 G. HONSTEmi, supra note
51, f 717-18.

93. See Supreme Sitting of the Order of Iron Hall v. Baker, 134
Ind. 293, 33 N.E. 1128, 1134-35 (1893); Tevis v. Hammersmith, 31 Ind.
App. 281, 316, 66 N.E. 79, aff'd, 161 Ind. 74, 67 N.E. 672 (1903). See also

Heit v. Brown, 47 F.R.D. 33 (D. Mass. 1967); Starr v. Shepard, 145
Mich. 302, 108 N.W. 709 (1906).
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terested majority is available to consider the complaint; (2)
the acts or transactions complained of are within the power of
the majority to ratify, and (3) the directors have failed to take
any remedial action, it is evident that the requirement will be
invoked in very few cases.9 4 Demand upon shareholders may
sometimes perform useful functions95 but in view of the tremendous burden such demands may entail and the rather
limited benefits that reasonably may be expected thereby, the
value of the demand as a procedural requirement is open to
serious question.9 6 Several states have abolished the require97
ment by statute.
B.

IN MmNmEOTA

Rule 23.06 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to allege his efforts to obtain action from the
shareholders, "if necessary"98 or allege with particularity his reasons for failing to make the demand. In Winter v. Farmers Educational Cooperative Union,99 the court acknowledged the two
main exceptions to the rule, that "a demand should be made
upon the shareholders unless they are powerless to ratify the
wrong alleged or unless the majority of their number is interested."100
It is clear that under Minnesota law, a majority cannot ratify
the directors' fraud or breach of fiduciary duty,10 1 so it follows
that no demand is required in such a case. Moreover, most of
the Minnesota cases involve close corporations, in which the di94. In fact, a demand upon shareholders is now rarely required.
See 2 G. HoRNsTEE, supra note 51, 1 717.
95. See Note, supra note 48, at 748.
96. See Dykstra, supra note 79.
97. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 834 (West Supp. 1969); N.Y. Bus.
p
Con . LAW, § 626 (McKinney 1963); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.311
(Supp. 1966).
98. See note 43 supra.
99. 259 Minn. 257, 107 N.W.2d 226 (1961).
100. Id., at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
101. See, e.g., Schmid v. Ballard, 175 Minn. 138, 220 N.W. 423 (1928);
Rothwell v. Robinson, 39 Minn. 1, 38 N.W. 772 (1888). It also appears
that ultra vires acts may not be ratified over the objection of an injured
minority. West Duluth Land Co. v. Northwestern Textile Co., 176 Minn.
588, 224 N.W. 245 (1929); Naftalin v. LaSalle Holding Co., 153 Minn. 482,
190 N.W. 887 (1922). Where the interest of the minority is adequately
protected, however, it may not enjoin a reasonable course of action
taken by the majority. Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186
Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932). Ratification may be inferred from
long-term acquiescence to the ultra vires acts. Boyum v. Johnson, 127
F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1942).
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rectors and majority shareholders axe frequently one and the
same. Since Winter would require a demand only where a mato ratify the
jority of disinterested shareholders have the power
10 2
wrong alleged, the requirement is rarely invoked.
The Minnesota court has not decided whether a shareholder
demand will be excused in cases involving large corporations
whose shareholders are numerous and widespread. In addition,
it has not decided whether the existence of working control in
the hands of a minority of shareholder-wrongdoers will obviate
the need for a demand.' 0 3 Should such a question be presented, it is to be hoped that the court would consider first
the merits of the complaint, evaluating the necessity of a shareholder demand requirement in view of the burdens it would
impose upon the parties affected and the benefits it might reasonably be expected to produce. Having traditionally been protective of the rights of minority shareholders, there is presently
little to suggest that the Minnesota courts would be disposed to
adhere rigidly to the requirement of a demand upon shareholders.
V. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF DISMISSAL
OR COMPROMISE
A.

IN GExmAL

Both tradition and sound public policy dictate that a plaintiff should be allowed to settle or compromise his claim as he
sees fit. However, the derivative plaintiff enforces the right of
the corporation rather than his own, and thus the proceeds of the
litigation properly belong to the corporation.10 4 Furthermore, in
a derivative action, a final judgment or a court approved settlement operates as res judicata to the corporation and all shareholders.'0 5 Therefore, to allow the individual plaintiff the un102. In no reported case has the Minnesota court denied relief or
dismissed a complaint on the grounds ihat the plaintiff failed to demand action from the shareholders.
103. Minnesota has recognized that a demand need not be made
upon the directors when the board is sufficiently "dominated" by a
wrongdoing minority. Winter v. Farmers Educ. Cooperative Union,
259 Minn. 257, 266, 107 N.W.2d 226, 235 (1961) (see text accompanying
note 75 supra); Shaw v. Staight, 107 linn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909)
(see text accompanying note 63 supra).
104. See, e.g., Singer v. Allied Factors, 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d
378 (1944); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
105. Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Barrett v. Shambeau, 187 Minn. 430, 245 N.W. 830 (1932). See also Butler v. Butler
Bros., 186 Minn. 144, 242 N.W. 701 (1932).
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conditional right to settle a derivative claim would not only be
illogical but would encourage strike suits and collusive settlements. 1 6 Accordingly, at a relatively early stage in the derecognized and
velopment of the derivative action some courts
07
asserted the power to supervise dismissals.'
Yet, while complete freedom to terminate may be undesirable, a settlement may frequently be preferable to continued
litigation. The directors, even if innocent of the alleged wrongdoing, may legitimately prefer a sizable settlement to the expense, unfavorable publicity and loss of time attendant upon a
lawsuit. 08 Likewise, the derivative plaintiff should not be forced
to maintain expensive litigation after it becomes apparent that
his claim has failed. 0 9 A private settlement may be especially
appropriate in litigation involving a closely held corporation, the
plaintiff being a locked-in minority shareholder. His claim is
personal, for all practical purposes, although he may have to
litigate in a derivative capacity. Vulnerable as he is to overreaching on the part of the majority, a private settlement or a
buy-out at a fair price may be the ideal solution. The courts
thus compromise between the parties' interest in minimizing
their costs and society's interest in discouraging strike suits and
collusive settlements. 1 0
The present federal rule, which is paralleled in most states,"'
106. Cf. May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941). The court implied that a derivative plaintiff
could settle or dismiss at will as long as no other shareholder had
sought to intervene. However, the case has received heavy criticism.
See generally 3B J. MOORE, supra note 59,
23.1.24[2], (p. 23.1-408);
Recent Decision, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 338 (1942).
107. See generally Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767 (1968); McLaughlin, Capacity
of a Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder Suit, 46 YALE
L.J. 421 (1936).
108. "Litigation may also be against the best interests of the corporation in that it would distract its officers from corporate affairs,
strain the loyalty of investors, employers, and creditors, and bare to
competitors and to the public its records, transactions and policies."
Note, 54 HARv. L. REV., 833, 834 (1954).
109. The unsuccessful plaintiff must bear his own litigation expenses. Eriksson v. Boyum, 150 Minn. 192, 184 N.W. 961 (1921).
110. See, e.g., 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 23.1.24[2] (p. 23.1406) (2d ed. 1969); Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 941 (1965) (see text accompanying note 2 supra); Fistel v.
Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Craftsman Fin. & Mtg. Co. v.
Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Winkelman v. General Motors
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
111. "[A derivative action] shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
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provides that a final settlement requires court approval and
authorizes the court to require that notice of any proposed dismissal. or compromise would serve the best interests of the
company and its shareholders. 112 This grant of discretionary
power has not gone unused. In order to gather data upon which
to evaluate a proposed settlement or compromise, some courts
have undertaken their own investigations 1 3 or appointed referees" 4 or special masters'15 for that purpose. In one case, the
judge went so far as to assemble the shareholders in open court
to ascertain their reaction to the proposal." 6
In practice, however, the power to supervise settlements is
not in itself sufficiently extensive to permit the court to control all possible abuse of the derivative action. It should be
recognized, for example, that a substantial portion of any settlement will commonly be received by the plaintiff as an allowance
for personal expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees. 1 7 If the
stockholder is presumed to act on behalf of the corporation, it
follows that he, like the directors, should be free to accept a reasonable settlement."18 But the practice of allowances, while it
favors settlements, may also encourage a self-serving lawyer to
provoke litigation upon claims of questionable merit, in hope of
generating income. The court should maintain strict vigilance in
or compromise shall be given to shareholders ... in such manner as

the court directs." FED.R. Civ. P. 23.1 (1968).
112. See Stella v.Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Masterson v.
Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953);
Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533 (D.R.I. '1953).
In appraising a proposed settlement the court may evaluate such
factors as the attorneys' fees proposed, the damage suffered by the corporation, the responsibility of the defendants for the loss, their ability
to respond in damages, the marginal cost to the corporation of continued litigation, and any other relevant factor. Note, 54 HARv. L. REv.
833, 838 (1941). The court must consider all the relevant facts, 3B J.
Moorm, supra note 110, f 23.1.24[2], and may approve a settlement over
the objection of the complaining parties. Abramson v. Pennwood Investment Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968); Masterson v. Pergament,

supra.
113. See Note, 54 HARv. L. REv.833, 839 (1941).
114. General Inv. Corp. v.Warriner, 259 App. Div. 400, 19 N.Y.S.2d
566 (1st Dept. 1940).

115. Cf. Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3rd Cir.),

cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1944).

116.

Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 154 Misc.

615, 276 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), affd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N.Y.S.

1007 (1st Dept. 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525, :195 N.E. 183 (1935).
117. See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's
Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. Rxv. 784 (3.939).

118. See McLaughlin, supra note 107, at 426.

19701

SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS

1001

awarding attorneys' fees, 119 but the problem remains a diffi20

cult one to control.1

Judicial control is incomplete in other ways as well. The
defendants' purchase of the complaining shareholder's stock
would not normally be viewed as a settlement,1 2 ' since in theory,
it would have no legal effect upon the merits of the lawsuit.
In reality, however, it might serve to rid the defendants of the
only shareholder qualified to sue or sufficiently contentious to
call them to account. The court is also powerless to prevent
an abandonment or discontinuance or to coerce a plaintiff who
ceases to actively prosecute, although in such cases the court
might attempt to induce other shareholders to take up or reopen the action. 122 In addition, a recent opinion of the Second
Circuit concludes, in effect, that federal rule 23.1 does not preclude a private out-of-court settlement by the corporation of a
23
claim which is the subject of a pending derivative action.
119. Cf. Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d
Cir. 1948), where a shareholder-plaintiff who had consented to a summary judgment upon payment of $5,000 to his attorney was held liable
to the corporation for the amount of $5,000 less "reasonable" attorney's
fees. See also Haudek, supranote 107, at 784.
120. "Making it easier for the legitimate plaintiff and harder for
the illegitimate is a problem which will never be wholly solved, but
some progress can be made." Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct,
47 HPAv. L. REv.1305, 1327 (1934).
121. See, e.g., Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1944); Malcolm v. Cities Serv. Co.,
2 F.R.D. 405 (D. Del. 1942). But where a shareholder-plaintiff accepts a
grossly inflated price for his stock-in effect, a private "settlement"-he
may be held accountable to the corporation for the proceeds. Young v.
Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.
2d 443, rehearing denied, 296 N.Y. 993, 71 N.E.2d 569 (1947). See also
Sauer v. Newhouse, 26 F. Supp. 326 (D.N.J. 1939) (court ordered notice
to be given to all shareholders of proposed sale of plaintiff's stock to
parties defendant).
122. Hovenden v. Chandler, 8 FED. RULEs SERV. 23c.1, Case 3 (D.
Okla. 1965); Malcolm v. Cities Serv. Co., 2 F.R.D. 405 (D. Del. 1942). See
also Craftsman Fin. & Mtg. Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y.
1945). A discontinuance does not act as res judicata, but instead revives the right of the other shareholders to sue. See McLaughlin, supra
note 107, at 424. However, a voluntary dismissal with prejudice,
which would bar a similar action by the plaintiff, may also preclude an
action by other shareholders. See Haudek, supranote 107, at 785.
123. Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
941 (1965). See also Adler v. Brooks, 375 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
The shareholder may still have the right to challenge the action
of the directors in releasing the corporation's claims, in either the original or a new derivative action. Frequently, however, such a change in
the posture of the action will reduce the shareholder's likelihood of success. See generally Comment, Compromise of Derivative Claims by a
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The power to supervise settlernaents should be diligently,
systematically and creatively cultivated. 1 24

Unlike the web of

rules designed to obstruct the potential derivative plaintiff, the
power to supervise settlements focuses directly upon the strike
suit problem by minimizing whatever opportunities the defendants may have to pacify the plaintiff. The judiciary should
supervise all out-of-court settlements-especially where the attorneys' fees alone are substantial. 1':5 The use of referees and
special masters should also be encouraged. Whenever the circumstances indicate that the contending parties might ignore
the interests of the corporation, the court should enjoin the
negotiation of a settlement in any form and attempt to determine whether other shareholders would be willing to join as
plaintiffs. The derivative action is itself an unusual proceeding,
and the unusual and persistent problems it presents do not
readily succumb to oblique attacks.
B.

IN AMINESOTA

The Minnesota Supreme Court; has established that the
mechanism of a collusive dismissal will not be permitted to
shield fraud.

In National Power & Paper Company v. Ross-

man,12 6 the court vacated the collusive dismissal of an action in
which the corporation-through its directors-had charged a
former director with misappropriation of assets. Holding that
the action could not be dismissed without due regard for the
best interests of the corporation, the court allowed shareholders
12 7
to reopen the action in derivative form. '

CorporationWithout Court Approval, 52 1A. L. REv. 342 (1966).
124. For an illustration of the flexibility of this power, see Delahanty v. Newark Morning Ledge Co., 26 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1939),
where the court disallowed the plaintiffs' motion for dismissal in order
to give the defendants, who had been put to the expense of preparing
for trial, an opportunity to vindicate themselves.
125. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 28, rehearing denied,
384 U.S. 967 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Friendly, J.). Cf. Wolf v.
Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (concurring opinion of Waterman, J.).
126. 122 Minn. 355, 142 N.W. 818 (191:3).
127. See also Lenhart v. Lenhart Wagon Co., 210 Minn. 164, 298
N.W. 37 (1941) in which the defendant--the principal directors, officers
and shareholders-had allowed a fraudulent claim for back salaries to
run against the corporation. Under the circumstances, the only party
whose interests were adversely affected was one of the minority shareholders, who was allowed to maintain en action on behalf of the corporation to set aside the fraudulent judgment.
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The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, adopting the terms
of the corresponding federal rule, expressly provide for judicial
supervision of settlements. 128 While no cases have arisen under
the Minnesota rule, the cases discussed above illustrate the
court's willingness to protect the innocent shareholder from
fraud or overreaching and to reopen a legal dispute when equity
so demands. Similar policy considerations should warrant the
exercise of discretionary power to supervise settlements if the
same interests may thereby be protected. This is not to assume
that the court should discourage all private settlements. Much
of the litigation in Minnesota involves close corporatons, where,
as noted, a private settlement may be singularly appropriate.
To the extent the court could require that any such settlement
adequately compensate the minority shareholder for his interest,
it should do so. By the same token, the court should assert its
power of supervision aggressively where the interests of a greater
number of shareholders are affected.
VI. OTHER CONTROLS
A. ALLOCATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Consistent with the theory that a derivative suit is an
action brought on behalf of the corporation, the successful plaintiff should be reimbursed by the corporation for his expenses
and attorneys' fees. 2 9 The corporation presumably would
have incurred costs of a similar nature had the directors brought
suit. As a practical matter, absent some provision for reimbursement, the derivative suit would be reduced to a luxury
available solely to the wealthy. 130 Under one interpretation of
the common law, the shareholder may be reimbursed only if the
outcome of the suit confers pecuniary benefit to the corporation.1 3 1

Minnesota, however, is one of a number of jurisdic-

tions1 32

that allows reimbursement when the action results in
any "substantial" benefit to the corporation. In Bosch v. Meeker
Cooperative Light & Power Association,8 3 following a determination that an election of directors and a proposed amendment
128. Rule 23.06, Derivative Actions by Shareholders or Members.
129. See text accompanying note 117 supra.

130. See generally Hornstein, note 117 supra.
131. See, e.g., Burley Tobacco Co. v. Vest, 165 Ky. 762, 178 S.W.
1102 (1915); Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct.
1909).
132. See Hornstein, supra note 117, at 798. See also text accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
133. 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
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to the bylaws were illegal, the court allowed the plaintiff a
reasonable amount to reimburse his expenses. While noting
that reimbursement might not be desired wherever a shareholder
prevailed, the court maintained that a shareholder should be
permitted-in fact induced-to redress a wrong even though
such action might not result in pecuniary benefit to the corporation. This test permits inquiry into all aspects of the effects of
the litigation. 134 Without attempting to define a standard, the
Bosch court stated somewhat reduntantly that a substantial ben'1 3
efit must be "more than technical in its consequence.' 1
In contrast, the court denied a successful shareholder-plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees in Aiple v. Twin City Barge &
Towing Company. 36 Prior to the development of the litigation,
the plaintiff had blocked a proposed recapitalization plan,
which by statute would have required a two-thirds vote. The
corporation then attempted to raise capital by exchanging certain of its assets for stock in a subsidiary corporation, but the
plaintiff successfully claimed that the transaction violated his
statutory rights. 37 Evidence indicated that the corporation did
need additional capital, but the plaintiff and the directors suffered long-standing disagreements and the plaintiff had an interest in a competing firm. The plaintiff then brought supplementary proceedings and moved for summary judgment to recover attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting the action. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion and
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
the action had been brought in good faith and whether a substantial benefit had accrued to the corporation. Noting that
134. Among the benefits courts have recognized as "substantial" are:
(a) cancellation of a proposed stock issue which would have
upset certain shareholders' voting rights;
(b) temporary injunction restraining the corporation from
paying certain sums of money;
(c) cancellation of a stock option plan;
(d) rescinding of share purchases by a corporation;
(e) enjoining of ultra vires acts.
See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74,
100 (1967).
In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950), dealing
with the indemnification of a director who successfully defends himself
on the merits, also reveals a broad view of corporate benefit. The
court maintained that the vindication of officers was itself a benefit to
the corporation, although the actual decision was grounded upon other
considerations. See Comment, 53 Mm.L. REv. 1055 (1969).
135. 257 Minn. at 366, 101 N.W.2d at 427.
136. 279 Minn. 22, 154 N.W.2d 898 (1967).
137. Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn. at 38, 143
N.W.2d at 374 (1966).
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the point was made in Bosch that a stockholder's success in an
action against the corporation does not of itself warrant an award
of attorneys' fees, the court stated that the fees and expenses
of a minority shareholder suing to enforce his statutory rights
should not be chargeable to the corporation where the results
benefit the shareholder personally rather than the corporation.
B. SECURITY FOR EXPENSES STATUTES
While Minnesota has no "security for expenses" statute,
the subject warrants discussion, as it represents one current
approach to the problem of strike suits. Security for expenses9
13
legislation was pioneeered in New York,138 following a study
which concluded that the existing controls had failed to prevent
"the growth of a veritable racket" in strike suits. 140 The New

York statute provides, in effect, that a derivative plaintiff whose
stock interest amounts to less than 5 percent of the outstanding
shares and less than $50,000 in market value, is required at
the option of the defendants to provide security for the defendants' expenses, 141 including attorneys' fees. This type of
statute has not escaped criticism. 142 First, the security requirement is based solely upon the shareholdings of the derivative
plaintiff, taking no account of the possible merits of his claim.
138. The general background of the pioneer New York statute is
discussed in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547
(1949). Compare SPECIAL ComiVTTE ON CORPOATE LITIGATION OF THE
CHAIBER

OF

COMMERCE

OF

THE

STATE

OF

NEw

YORK,

SURVEY

AND

REPORT REGAmING STOCKHOLDERs' DERiVATVE SurTs (1944), with Horn-

stein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L.
REV. 1 (1947).
Over a dozen states have now enacted security for expenses statutes.
See Dykstra, supra note 134, at 88-89.
139.

SPECIAL CoImriTTEE ON CORPORATE LITIGATION OF THE CHANMER

138, at 1.
140. See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative
Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 n.39 (1944).
141. Ch. 668, § 61-b, [1944] N.Y. Laws 1455 presently N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
Shareholders may pool their interests in order to make up the
OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note

minimum ownership requirement. Fuller v. American Mach. & Found.
Co., 95 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Baker v. McFadden Publications,
Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950). Additional shareholders may
have to meet the contemporaneous ownership test, however. Security
for expenses statutes are treated as "substantive" and are applied by the
federal courts in actions arising under common law, Cohen v. Beneficial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949), but they need not be applied
in a suit to enforce a cause of action arising under federal law. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1961).
142. See Hornstein, notes 136 & 138 supra.
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Second, by its terms, the statute discriminates against the small
shareholder, imposing neither burde:a nor liability on a shareholder whose interest meets the specified standard. It may be
that a substantial investor in the corporation is less likely to
bring a nuisance claim, and it cannot be doubted that legislation
of this kind deters strike suitors, 143 but its most significant effect is to create a barrier to shareholder suits-regardless of
their merits. Such an effect inevitably protects wrongdoing
management, and has in fact, been labelled as an attempt to
insulate corporate management from investors who discover
that the corporation has been looted. 44
In comparison, the California statute' 45 applies equally to
large and small investors, thus avoiding the arbitrary discrimination inherent in a statute of the New York type. Security is
limited to a maximum of $25,000, and need be posted only after
the court has determined (1) that there is no reasonable probability that the corporation will benefit from the litigation of
the claim, or (2) that the defendant :requesting security was not
personally involved in the transaction in dispute. However, the
plaintiff is not entitled to discovery privileges until after a
motion for security has been disposed of,' 46 and without the
aid of discovery a plaintiff may be unable to resist such a motion successfully. In addition, the California law exposes the
plaintiff to liability for the expenses of any defendant, whether
corporate insider or third party.
Management's answer to the strike suit problem may be
simply to bar shareholders from the courts, but in the absence of
rampant and widespread abuses by shareholders, security for
expenses legislation can best be explained as a preference for
management's interests. In Minnesota, such legislation would
run counter to the needs and spirit of the law.
VII. CONCLUSION
It has been said that courts seem to define the control requirements in light of their own conceptions of the desirability
of the derivative suit remedy. 47 This analysis has a certain
143. See Hornstein, supranote 138, at 5.
144. Id. at 3.
145.

CAL. Corn'. CODE § 834 (West Supp. 1969).

146. See, e.g., Barber v. Lewis & Kaufman, Inc., 125 C.A.2d 95, 269
P.2d 929 (1954); Melancon v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
42 Cal. 2d 698, 268 P.2d 1050 (1954).

147. See Note, Demand on Directors and Stockholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARv. L. Ra. 746, 747 (1960).
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appeal. Certainly it is true that shareholder-litigants have been
greeted with varying degrees of hostility and enthusiasm. Neither reaction is unsupportable but the proper rationale would be
to reconcile the two. Although abuse of the action has occurred,
shareholders have accomplished the desired result of policing the
148
corporate system.
The indiscriminate tightening of control requirements in order to curb abuses, however, is to subordinate the basic policy
of the derivative suit. Without ignoring the legitimate interests
of management, the Minnesota court has been consistently cognizant of the interests of the small shareholder. The sound
policies underlying the controls have not been ignored, yet a
flexible approach to the technical structure of the derivative
suit evidences a judicial recognition of the importance of such
actions. It may seem rather anomalous, then, that the most significant recent development in the law of Minnesota has been
the adoption in 1968 of the contemporaneous ownership requirement by the Court, sua sponte and without any demonstrated
need for the rule. It is to be hoped that this development does
not reflect a growing hostility toward shareholders' suits, and
that the court will use its powers in such a way as to develop the effectiveness of the derivative action.

148. See Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends are Corporate Managements
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SociETY 49 (E. Mason ed.
1959); Dykstra, supra note 134, at 74.

